1 Copy to be made available on the Social Science Research Network, www.ssrn.com (click on "search" and under author's first name put in Lynn and under last name put in McLain). More information will also be included in the 2010 pocket parts to McLain, volumes 5, 6 , and 6A of Maryland Evidence: State and Federal, which is accessible on Westlaw as [vol. no.] Maryland Evidence [sec. no.] . The section numbers generally correlate with the root of the Md. Rule number; e.g., Md. Rule 5-103 is discussed at § § 103:1 et seq. Volume 5 addresses the 100's-400's Rules; volume 6 covers privileges through the 700's Rules; Volume 6A covers 800's-1000's, plus the parol evidence rule at 1101:1. In Lancaster v. State, 410 Md. 352, 355, 978 A.2d 717 (2009) , the Court of Appeals acknowledged "the increasing problems posed by cases of gang-related intimidation of witnesses, which cannot be overstated," but held that the circuit court had abused its discretion and deprived the defendant of effective assistance of counsel by granting a pretrial protective order that required criminal defense counsel in a drug distribution-related case to delay disclosing to the defendant, until the day of trial, " 'the names, [current] addresses, and statements of certain prosecution witnesses.' " The majority, in an opinion authored by Judge Thieme, distinguished the seminal case of Coleman v. State, 321 Md. 586, 583 A.2d 1044 (1991 , and upbraided the circuit court as follows:
Here, unlike in Coleman, the State failed to present any evidence at the protective order hearing about the victim witnesses' testimony or the facts surrounding the alleged crime, other than the fact that it took place inside a home. With respect to the non-victim civilian witnesses, the State failed to present any evidence regarding their identity, their expected testimony regarding Lancaster's alleged robbery, or the importance of that testimony to the State's case. Moreover, the State failed to present any evidence regarding "specific threats" from Lancaster, his brother, or their associates against the witnesses. No evidence was presented regarding Lancaster's reputation for violence, or the reputation for violence, if any, of his brother and associates. The State also failed to identify any persons who might have carried out the alleged threats against the witnesses, as Lancaster and his brother were incarcerated at the time that the alleged threats were made.
410 Md. at 379-80.
II.
Jury Selection
A.
Voir Dire Charles v. State, ___ A.2d ___, 2010 WL 2431083 (June 18, 2010 ) (abuse of discretion and reversible error in instructing prospective jurors that CSI dramas are unrealistic and asking them whether they would be able to "convict" without "CSI-type" "scientific" evidence).
•
• (2010) held that counsel had failed to preserve an objection that expert testimony did not meet the Frye-Reed test when counsel did not request a Frye-Reed hearing at trial. The state alleged that the defendant had attacked the victim after she broke up with him. The victim had initially named the defendant as her assailant but had recanted. The defense had objected generally, during discovery, to the State's expert's testimony regarding the psychological symptoms of battered women, though the objection was apparently treated by the trial judge as an objection to the expert's qualifications, rather than as a Frye-Reed objection. The defense had also made eleven separate general objections during the witness's testimony, as well as a continuing objection to her testimony. The Court of Special Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Wright, held that none was sufficient to allow the defendant to raise a Frye-Reed issue on appeal.
B. To Preserve Constitutional Grounds, Be Sure to State Them in Your Objection
• See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 410 Md. 91, 976 A.2d 1072 (2009 </cite> (declining to address question of violation of defendant's right to a public trial, when counsel failed to object to exclusion of defendant's family and certain other non-witnesses from courtroom).
C. Objection to Impeachment of Accused by His or Her Prior Convictions
• Dallas v. State, 413 Md. 569, 993 A.2d 655 (2010) (distinguishing Luce and cases regarding motions in limine, and holding question preserved in case where court declined to rule immediately prior to accused's opportunity to take the stand).
D. Need to Seek a Ruling
Compare Malarkey v. State, 188 Md. App. 126, 155-57, 981 A.2d 675 (2009) (counsel waived claim that trial court should have granted motion for acquittal, when "the defense repeatedly moved for acquittal, and the court repeatedly reserved. But, appellant never made known to the court that he was entitled to a ruling before submission to the jury.") with Parker v. State, 189 Md. App. 474, 492, 985 A.2d 72 (2009) ("the court's refusal to permit counsel to approach the bench to argue the motion [for a mistrial] in greater detail effectively denied the motion").
E. Need to Offer for Limited Admissible Purpose
• Washington v. State, 191 Md. App. 48, 67-70, 990 A.2d 549 (2010) (failure to argue to trial curt that witness's prior convictions were admissible to show propensity and not just to impeach failed to preserve that question for appeal). proper subject of judicial notice, and without the need for a Frye-Reed hearing, the admissibility of fingerprint evidence based on the ACE-V method of identification; any issues concurring the reliability of a particular identification could be adequately addressed on cross-examination of the fingerprint examiner). The case involved handprint evidence, but the parties agreed that the same law applied as to fingerprint evidence.
F. Both Polling the Jury and Hearkening the Verdict Cannot Be Waived

VI. Balancing Risk of Unfair Prejudice and Confusion against Probative Value: Rule 5-403
A. Impeachment Evidence
• Rodriguez v. State, 191 Md. App. 196, 991 A.2d 100 (2010) (no abuse of discretion in sustaining objection to cross-examination of burglary victim concerning his original statement to the police that he suspected a third party in the first of the charged burglaries, when defense failed to offer any factual predicate for the line of questioning, and it would have served only to confuse the jury).
• Washington v. State, 191 Md. App. 48, 72-76, 79-85, 990 A.2d 549 (2010) (no abuse of discretion in exclusion of evidence that witness had failed to register as a sex offender).
B. Photographs; Sympathy
• Morris v. State, 192 Md. App. 1, 993 A.2d 716 (2010) (no abuse of discretion to permit murder victim's wife to identify an autopsy photograph of him and to testify about his activities with their children before he went to work to guard appellant, an inmate, while he was in hospital).
VII. Character Evidence
A. Prior Acts of Police Officers: Rules 5-404(b) and 5-608(b)
Md. Public Safety Code Ann. § 3-110 was amended, effective October 1, 2010, as follows:
On written request, a law enforcement officer may have expunged from any file the record of a formal complaint made against the law enforcement officer if:
(1) (i) the law enforcement agency that investigated the complaint:
1.
exonerated the law enforcement officer of all charges in the complaint; or 2.
determined that the charges were unsustained or unfounded; or (ii) a hearing board acquitted the law enforcement officer, dismissed the action, or made a finding of not guilty; and (2) at least 3 years have passed since the final disposition by the law enforcement agency or hearing board.
(B) EVIDENCE OF A FORMAL COMPLAINT AGAINST A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE OR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IF THE COMPLAINT RESULTED IN AN OUTCOME LISTED IN
SUBSECTION (A)(1) OF THIS SECTION.
Query: What does this do to evidence of the acts underlying the complaint?
• 
B.
Acts that Are Not "Other Acts" under Rule 5-404(b)
• Odum v. State, 412 Md. 593, 608-15, 989 A.2d 232 (2010) (no abuse of discretion in admitting, in defendant's retrial on kidnapping charges, evidence of the other offenses and murders that occurred "during the criminal episode," immediately before and after the kidnappings, even though this defendant had been acquitted of those charges at first trial; "[T]he strictures of 'other crimes' evidence law, now embodied in Rule 5-404(b), do not apply to evidence of crimes (or other bad acts or wrongs) that arise during the same transaction and are intrinsic to the charged crime or crimes. We define 'intrinsic' as including, at a minimum, other crimes that are so connected or blended in point of time or circumstances with the crime or crimes charged that they form a single transaction, and the crime or crimes charged cannot be fully shown or explained without evidence of the other crimes.").
C. Opening the Door under Rule 5-404(a): The "People Who Live in Glass Houses Shouldn't Throw Stones" Provision
The defense chooses whether to open the door to unfavorable reputation or opinion evidence from character witnesses called by the State regarding the defendant's character trait relevant to the charged crime.
Currently that door will be opened if the defense either (1) offers favorable reputation or opinion evidence regarding the accused or (2) makes a sweeping claim of innocence. A 2000 amendment to the corollary federal rule adds another way: (3) when the defense offers unfavorable reputation or opinion evidence regarding the victim, that opens the door for the prosecution to offer similar evidence regarding the same trait of the accused. The Rules Committee has proposed a similar amendment to Md. Rule 5-404(a). Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) , under which a suspect who has invoked his right to the presence of counsel during custodial interrogation is not subject to further interrogation until either counsel has been made available or the suspect himself further initiates exchanges with the police, does not apply if a break in custody lasting at least 14 days has occurred).
VIII. Fifth Amendment
• Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (U.S. 2010) (form of Miranda warnings that was used sufficed to convey their substance).
• The question before the Berghuis Court was whether the Michigan state courts had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they found that no Miranda violation had occurred under these facts: the defendant had been read his Miranda rights; he did not say that he wanted either to remain silent or an attorney, nor that he did not want to talk to the police; and he made an oral, one-word, incriminating response after about 2 hours and 45 minutes into the custodial interrogation (during which he had remained largely silent), but declined to sign a written waiver. The defense made no contention that he did not understand his rights.
But Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held more broadly that the defendant had not invoked his Miranda rights, as such invocation must be "unambiguous":
Thompkins did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police. Had he made either of these simple, unambiguous statements, he would have invoked his " 'right to cut off questioning.' " Here he did neither, so he did not invoke his right to remain silent.
The majority also held that the prosecution had shown that the defendant had waived his rights: "Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent."
IX.
Competency of Witnesses: Rule 5-601
• Jones v. State, 410 Md. 681, 685-92, 697-99, 980 A.2d 469 (2009) (no clear error in trial court's determination that six-year-old child was competent to testify, even though he gave some incorrect responses during voir dire).
X. Impeachment by Prior Convictions: Rule 5-609
• Dallas v. State, 413 Md. 569, 993 A.2d 655, 665 & n.11 (2010) held that the defendant's election not to testify, when based on the trial court's deferring a ruling on whether it will permit the defendant to be impeached by his or her prior convictions, is not an issue "of constitutional dimension."
Under the facts in Dallas, the majority of the Court of Appeals held, in an opinion by Judge Barbera, that the trial court had not abused its discretion in deferring a ruling on a defense motion in limine to exclude prior conviction impeachment evidence until the defendant testified, when the judge had initially said he would permit the impeachment, but then said he would reserve the ruling until he heard defendant's testimony, so he could perform the Md. Rule 5-609 balancing test. Nonetheless, Judge Barbera stressed that trial courts should rule on such motions as early as practicable, and that the best practice is to accept a proffer of the defendant's testimony and make an in limine ruling before the defendant takes the stand, with the understanding that alteration in the testimony may change the 5-609 result.
XI.
Questioning by Court: Rule 5-614
• Diggs v. State, 409 Md. 260, 973 A.2d 796 (2009) • Wilder v. State, 191 Md. App. 319, 347-69, 991 A.2d 172 (2010) (reversible error in a trial court's allowing, over objection, a police officer neither qualified nor disclosed as an expert to testify concerning his use of mapping software and cellular telephone hacking codes on cell phone records to plot locations of the cell phone user on a map). See Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706, 870 A.2d 609 (2005) .
B. Expert Testimony on Frailties of Eyewitness I.D.'s: Rule 5-702
• Bomas v. State, 412 Md. 392, 407, 417, 419, 987 A.2d 98 (2010) , rejected the defendantpetitioner's argument that expert testimony on the frailties of eyewitness identification should be presumptively admissible, or at least be favored, especially in cases like Bomas, where eyewitness testimony forms the foundation of the State's case. The court held that the motions judge had not abused her discretion in excluding the testimony of the defense's proffered expert when it was "extremely general, vague, and inconclusive," would have been "unhelpful" and "confusing" to the jury, and "lacked adequate citation to studies or data. . . ."
C. Opinion on Ultimate Issue: Rule 5-704
• Gauvin v. State, 411 Md. 698, 985 A.2d 513 (2009) (because Rule 5-704(b) makes a "critical distinction between (1) an explicitly stated opinion that the criminal defendant had a particular mental state, and (2) an explanation of why an item of evidence is consistent with a particular mental state," trial court did not err in admitting officer's testimony that amount of PCP and presence of rubber gloves indicated an intent of possessor to distribute; failure to sustain objection to improper question whether seized drugs were "for [defendant's] personal consumption or for distribution" was harmless error, because officer did not so testify).
XIII. Hearsay
A. Implied Assertions No More? Stoddard to Bernadyn to Fields to Garner: Rule 5-801
In a 5 to 2 vote in Garner v. State, ___ Md. ___, 2010 WL 1957227 (May 18, 2010 ) (Sept. Term 2009 , the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not erred in permitting a police officer to testify that he answered the cell phone confiscated from the defendant during his arrest, said "hello," and "a male voice" said, "Yo, can I get a 40." Judge Murphy, writing for the majority, reasoned that "[w]hen a telephone is used to receive illegal wagers or to receive orders called in by persons who wish to purchase a controlled dangerous substance, the telephone becomes an instrumentality of the crime," and that "the rule against hearsay does not operate to exclude evidence of the 'verbal act' that established a consequential fact: Petitioner was in possession of a telephone called by a person who requested to purchase cocaine." At first blush, this "verbal act" rationale would differentiate the bookie-betting parlor and drug order cases like Garner from cases like Stoddard and Bernadyn. But whether Garner is so limited-and indeed exactly what its rationale is-is unclear. . . .
B.
Rule Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
* * * The product of such interrogation [as in Hammon] , whether reduced to a writing signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the interrogating officer, is testimonial. It is, in the terms of the 1828 American dictionary quoted in Crawford, " '[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.' " * * * And finally, the difference in the level of formality between the two interviews [in Crawford and in Davis] is striking. Crawford was responding calmly, at the station house, to a series of questions, with the officer-interrogator taping and making notes of her answers; McCottry's frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911 operator could make out) safe. 
Facts:
The victim lived with his brother within a few houses of defendant, from whom he had been purchasing cocaine for three years. The victim's brother testified that defendant sold drugs to the victim at defendant's back door. On April 28, 2001, the victim told his brother that he planned to redeem an expensive coat that he had pawned with defendant in exchange for some cocaine. On April 29, 2001 , between 3:00 and 3:30 a.m., the brother heard gunfire, and at about 3:25 a.m., five police officers responded to a radio dispatch indicating that a man had been shot. They found the victim lying on the ground next to his car at a gas station about six blocks from defendant's house. The victim had a gunshot wound in his abdomen and appeared to be in considerable pain. In response to the officers' questioning, the victim indicated that he had been shot at approximately 3:00 a.m. while standing outside defendant's back door. The victim stated that before being shot he had a short conversation through a closed door with defendant. He identified defendant as the shooter because, although he did not see defendant shoot him, he knew that it was defendant who had shot him because he recognized defendant's voice. While the victim described defendant as being 40 years old, 5' 7" tall, and about 140 pounds, according to defendant's driver's license, defendant was actually 30 years old, 5' 10" tall, and 180 pounds. Although the brother testified that the victim knew defendant's last name, the victim himself told the police that he did not know defendant's last name. The victim told the police that, after he was shot, he drove himself to the gas station. The victim died within a few hours after he was transported to the hospital. When the police left the gas station, they immediately proceeded to defendant's house. The police found what appeared to be blood and a bullet on defendant's back porch and what the police believed to be a bullet hole in the back door. The victim's wallet and identification were also discovered outside defendant's house. However, the police did not discover any drugs, guns, bullets, or the victim's coat when they searched defendant's house at approximately 5:30 a.m. on the morning of the shooting. Defendant's girlfriend testified that defendant was not home at the time of the shooting and that she had not heard any gunfire that morning. The medical examiner testified that the bullet that killed the victim had passed through an intermediary target, such as a door. Toxicology tests showed that the victim had consumed cocaine within four hours of his death. Defendant was arrested one year later in California and was extradited to Michigan. S. 409 (1985) for the proposition that evidence that is offered for a nonhearsay purpose does not implicate the confrontation clause.
Query
Query: In a prosecution for credit card fraud, if the State offers records of the issuing bank, made by the bank when flagging suspect purchases, are those records testimonial?
b. Who has to be called to testify?
Footnote 1 in Melendez-Diaz:
[W]e do not hold . . . that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case. * * * It is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of custody are so crucial as
4.
When are hospital employees agents of the police?
• See Griner v. State, 168 Md. App. 714, 895 A.2d 189 (2006) (decided pre-Davis) (child's statements to nurse nontestimonial, although child had been brought into hospital by police).
Dying declarations
• Head v. State, 171 Md. App. 642, 912 A.2d 1 (2006 ), cert. denied, 398 Md. 315 (2007 , avoided the question, finding the statement nontestimonial under Davis.
6.
Does "testimonial" include statements made to someone other than the police or an agent of the police?
• See Clark v. Alaska, 199 P.3d 1203 (Alaska App. 2009) (applying Davis' primary purpose test when declarant, who told ER nurse and doctor that she had been assaulted by defendant, was brought to hospital by a friend, and there was no police involvement; because primary purpose of hospital interview was to obtain or provide medical care, her statements were nontestimonial) (note that hearsay objection was waived . . .).
B.
Forfeiture
